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David Cameron’s speech to the Conservative Party conference in Manchester today marks the end of the major
parties’ conference season. In the 2012 audit of UK democracy, Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Andrew Blick, and Stephen
Crone considered how influential members were on political party policies, including via conferences and other
mechanisms. They found varying levels of influence across the major parties, with Conservative members having
the least sway over policy.
How much influence do Conservative members have over party policy? Credit: Conservatives (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
While there is much truth in the characterisation of contemporary UK political parties as ‘electoral professional’
organisations, it can also be argued that it ‘does not quite describe the realities of modern British party politics’.
Indeed, as Childs notes, there is plenty of evidence that party leaders would like to have more members and
activists to call on, and that they would prefer their parties to be less reliant on big donors. In many ways, the more
significant tension is that ‘despite wanting to attract more members, party leaderships remain wary of giving their
membership too much power’.
It is equally important to distinguish between the membership at large and the rather smaller core of party activists
who, in the past, mediated much of the interaction between members and leaders. It is widely accepted, for
instance, that internal Labour Party reforms from the early 1990s onwards were motivated by a desire to empower
members as a check on the influence of activists, who were deemed by party leaders to be more left-wing than
either the parliamentary party or the wider membership. In this sense, apparently democratising reforms can be
managed by party leaders to help modernise a party and enhance central. For these reasons, our 2002 Audit noted
that signs of UK political parties becoming more internally democratic tended to co-exist alongside indicators of the
very opposite trend.
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While the manner in which UK parties select their leaders shows a degree of convergence, mechanisms for
involving members and, indeed, non-members in other aspects of party decision-making exhibit quite different
trends.  The degree of internal democracy within the UK’s political parties varies enormously. Prior to the last
general election, the campaign organisation Unlock Democracy evaluated the extent to which the UK’s largest
political parties showed a strong commitment to democracy, including an assessment of the degree to which
members and non-members could influence party policy and candidate selection. This assessment suggested that,
among the three main parties, internal democracy is weakest within the Conservative Party and strongest within the
Liberal Democrats, although Labour gained some recognition for granting a role for members of affiliated trade
unions and socialist societies. Among the smaller parties, internal democracy is generally much stronger – most
notably in the cases of the Greens, Plaid Cymru and the SNP, although Unlock Democracy found limited evidence of
mechanisms for engaging non-members. The BNP, by contrast, was found to be highly centralised.
Role of party conferences
The nature of membership involvement in party conferences offers important clues about the extent of member
influence on political parties more generally. The role of party conferences in determining party policy contrasts
markedly between the three main parties. These differences have been neatly captured by Peter Facey, Unlock
Democracy’s Director, in the following terms: ‘the Liberal Democrat conference thinks it makes policy and it does,
the Labour conference thinks it makes policy but doesn’t and the Conservative conference knows it doesn’t make
policy and doesn’t care’. That said, there has been something of a common trend across the three largest parties for
conferences to become showcase media events, rather than forums for policy deliberation, although this tendency
is clearly less pronounced for the Liberal Democrats. To some extent these developments are understandable. Party
leaders are keen to avoid what they see as highly damaging media coverage of disunity or adoption of policies which
risk being a ‘difficult sell’ to voters. Yet, the changing nature of party conferences has clearly become a source of
frustration for some party members, as Tony Benn expressed in his reflections on Labour’s 2000 annual conference:
‘Once we had regular and proper argument […] now we just let off balloons, sing pop songs, greet showbiz
celebrities and, if we’re lucky, have the odd debate’.
Labour
While Benn’s nostalgia for the atmosphere of past Labour conferences will not be universally shared within the
party, his observations do help highlight wider issues about how members are supposed to be able to shape party
policy. Labour’s formal processes for engaging party members in policy development are complex and reflect a
wider tendency for party leaders to attempt to recast opportunities for member involvement in a way which shifts
policy debate away from party conferences. Reforms were introduced by Tony Blair in 1997 as part of his
Partnership in Power agenda, through which ‘Labour’s policy machinery was completely revamped’. Under these
arrangements, Labour Party policy is determined by a National Policy Forum, based on reports from six policy
commissions and with the process steered by a Joint Policy Committee.  Despite some relatively optimistic initial
assessment of these reforms, dissatisfaction with them began to mount during the 2000s – notwithstanding
attempts to bolster the role of policy commissions. The mechanisms for policy-making were later reviewed as part of
the ‘Refounding Labour’ initiative, overseen by Peter Hain MP.
Liberal Democrats
It is widely recognised that, of the three main parties, the Liberal Democrats grant the fullest degree of influence
over policy to their members. Formally, the Liberal Democrats are a highly decentralised party, organised on a
federal basis, and with considerable autonomy provided to: the state parties (England, Scotland and Wales),
regional parties (for the English regions), local parties, and Specified Associated Organisations (e.g. Association of
Liberal Democrat Councillors; Ethnic Minority Liberal Democrats). All of these organisational sub-units can, for
instance, submit motions to the federal conference, which serves as the sovereign policy-making body for the party.
 However, it is generally recognised that most substantive policy is developed by the Federal Policy Committee,
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which is chaired by the party leader. It has also been argued that the reality of policy-making within the Liberal
Democrats is that MPs play a far more significant role than is generally recognised: ‘the parliamentary party has
established a relatively tight grip on the policy-making mechanisms within the Liberal Democrats despite the
constitutional limits on its power’. Much the same argument can be made with regard to the role of the parliamentary
party in determining who leads the party, as the ‘coups’ to oust both Charles Kennedy and then Ming Campbell
underline.
The influence of Liberal Democrat MPs and peers in shaping party policy has clearly grown as the size of the
parliamentary party has expanded – in part because of the staffing and other resources which MPs, in particular,
have access to. This tendency for Liberal Democrat parliamentarians to exercise power far beyond that ascribed to
them in the party’s constitution has almost certainly been strengthened since the Liberal Democrats formed a
coalition government with the Conservatives in May 2010. Even the party’s ‘triple-lock mechanism’, designed to
provide members with the power of veto over significant changes of strategic direction, is perhaps best understood
as a case of party members following the lead of the parliamentary party.
Conservatives
Of the three main parties, the Conservative Party grants least influence to members in the formulation of policy. As
Bale notes, the party leader dominates the Conservative Party and, in opposition in particular, the party operates as
‘an essentially top-down organization’. Indeed, Bale portrays the Conservative Party’s vesting of power and
autonomy in its leader as almost the polar opposite of the Labour Party’s model of organisation, while noting that
with this power comes very clear personal responsibility; compared to Labour, the Conservative Party tends to be
ruthlessly effective in removing leaders who do not deliver. Nonetheless, disquiet within the Conservative Party is
not always restricted to concerns about how a leader is performing. Clear tensions emerged between constituency
parties and the parliamentary party after the Conservatives’ 1997 election defeat and the, admittedly ‘tiny’, Charter
Movement within the party began to push for greater internal democracy.
These dynamics were a significant, but by no means the only, factor in William Hague promising delegates at the
1997 party conference that the ‘party is going to involve its members more than ever before’. As well as the
introduction of one member one vote elections in the final round of leadership contests, Hague’s reforms included
the use of regular ballots of the membership to consult on policy development (see the case study below) and the
introduction of new policy forums. However, these changes were clearly not a response to member demands alone,
and it would be naïve to assume either that the measures significantly empowered members, or that they were ever
intended to. While designed to assuage disquiet among constituency parties and the party membership at large, the
wider package of reforms introduced by Hague are widely recognised to have been motivated by a desire to
modernise and centralise the party. As Bale notes, ‘the reforms also granted unprecedented rights to the centre […]
to intervene in the affairs of associations deemed to be failing to meet specified “minimum criteria” on membership,
fund-raising and campaigning’. In a similar vein, Driver finds that neither Hague’s policy forums nor the later
specialist groups appointed to develop policy under David Cameron have undermined the ‘firm grip’ of the party
leadership on the determination of party policy.
Case study: Consulting Conservative Party members on policy
The Conservative Party has never granted its members any real influence over policy, which has
generally been the preserve of senior party figures (albeit with significant influence from leading right-
of-centre think-tanks in recent decades). However, following William Hague’s elevation to the
leadership in 1997, the Conservative Party began to consult its membership on policy via periodic
membership ballots. In contrast to the use of OMOV to select a party leader, introduced as part of the
same package of reforms, these ballots asked members to endorse anything from a set of principles
to a single policy position or an entire draft manifesto. In total, five such ballots took place after 1997,
beginning with the October 1997 vote to endorse the principles outlined by Hague following his
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election as leader under the previous system (in which only Conservative MPs had been able to
vote). Further ballots followed in February 1998 on Hague’s proposed party reforms (entitled Fresh
Future) and, in October 1998, on the specific issue of the party’s position on EU membership.
Relatively high levels of participation in these first three ballots, and the large majorities in support of
the central party in each instance, provided a sense of legitimacy for Hague’s leadership. However,
the fourth ballot in October 2000, in which members were asked to endorse the draft
manifesto, Believing in Britain, saw a sharp drop in the number of ballots returned to just over
50,000, representing a ‘turnout’ of around 16 per cent. Moreover, subsequent party leaders were less
enthusiastic than Hague about the use of membership ballots on matters of policy. There were no
such ballots under Iain Duncan-Smith or Michael Howard and the only time the membership has
been balloted by David Cameron was on his Built to Last statement of aims and values in September
2006. As Bale notes, this last membership ballot proved to be something of a ‘damp squib’, with only
a quarter of the membership participating. Of possibly greater concern, however, was that the
number of ballot papers issued (247,000) seriously undermined the party’s earlier claims that
membership levels had surged under Cameron.
The post is based on extracts from the 2012 audit of UK democracy. For further discussion see section 2.2.3 Parties
as membership organisations.
Stuart Wilks-Heeg, Andrew Blick, and Stephen Crone are the authors of the 2012 Democratic Audit report. 
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